Ukraine's Endgame: Four Scenarios for 2025

US policy and Europe's reactions shape the conflict

Photo by Max Kukurudziak on Unsplash

About the author: Peter Wildeford is a top forecaster, ranked top 1% every year since 2022. Here, he shares the news and analysis that informs his forecasts.

Something shocking recently happened at the United Nations — the US rejected a UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion. In addition to blaming Zelenskyy for the war, Trump called the Ukrainian leader a dictator last week and refused to do the same for Putin when prompted by reporters. This dramatic reversal under the Trump administration signals a fundamental shift in US-Ukraine relations that will reshape the conflict's trajectory over the coming year.

What’s going on? And where does Ukraine go from here?

Understanding US Foreign Policy Evolution

Obama

The crisis in Ukraine didn't begin in 2022. Instead, it was set in motion more than a decade prior by fundamental miscalculations in US foreign policy by the Bush and Obama administrations’s response to early Russian aggression in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014). Operating within what political scientist Francis Fukuyama termed the “end of history” paradigm, the Bush and Obama administrations believed liberal democracy's global triumph was inevitable and that major power competition was obsolete — and thus did not foresee the geopolitical threat that Russia would present.

When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, the response from the Bush and Obama administrations remained limited to diplomatic protests. Later, Obama’s pursued a “reset” policy with Russia in 2009 that presumed Moscow could be integrated into a rules-based order despite growing evidence of Putin's revisionist ambitions.

This fundamental misreading continued through 2014, when Obama characterized Russia as merely a “regional power” after the Crimea annexation. Obama rejected bipartisan calls to supply defensive weapons to Ukraine, fearing “escalation” while inadvertently signaling to Putin that limited aggression would face limited consequences. This calibrated restraint ultimately emboldened rather than constrained Russian expansionism, resulting in the war we have today.

Biden

With hindsight, it's clear the Bush and Obama administrations misinterpreted the Russian moment. Rather than witnessing “end of history”, we experienced Robert Kagan’s “return of history” — the reemergence of great power competition and contested spheres of influence. The current conflict in Ukraine represents the costly price of learning this lesson.

When the conflict dramatically escalated in 2022, President Biden improved on Obama’s weakness, refusing to give in to Putin's conquests and narratives. Instead, Biden viewed Ukraine as a critical front in a broader democratic-authoritarian contest requiring sustained Western unity.

The plan was for three primary objectives: preserve Ukraine's sovereignty, impose costs on Russia for its aggression, and strengthen NATO cohesion. Biden rejected direct negotiations with Putin without Ukrainian participation, insisting that “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” Additionally, Biden never wavered on providing Ukraine with resources needed to defend itself — delivering over $64 billion in military aid — even amid growing Republican opposition in Congress.

Trump’s Approach to Ukraine

Today, we're witnessing a dramatically different approach under Trump, who views the conflict primarily through a cost-benefit analysis within a narrower conception of American interests. Trump is willing to negotiate with Putin without Ukraine or Europe present and willing to provide significant concessions to Putin that Biden never would. Why?

The prioritizer lens

Biden viewed the Ukraine war as a fundamental battle between democracy and authoritarianism that could not be resolved by any compromise short of a full Russian withdrawal.

The Trump administration approach on the other hand is best understood through the ‘prioritizer’ framework of Republican foreign policy — a view that sees Ukraine aid as diverting critical military and economic capacity needed for deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. Prioritizers argue that China is a peer competitor capable of fundamentally challenging US global power and thus the threat from China requires America's full attention and resources. This means that the US cannot afford to continue to defend Ukraine.

However, it is important to keep in mind that the Republican party and the Trump administration are far from unified in a ‘prioritizer’ framework. This could lead to changes in foreign policy over the remainder of the Trump administration.

The Russian reset

To better combat China, Trump is attempting to curry favor with Russia with the goal to split the current Russia-China alliance. This attempt to reset relations with Russia is hardly new — past administrations have tried the same from Clinton's 1993 “Partnership for Peace” to Bush's claim he “got a sense of Putin's soul” to Obama's literal “Reset” button in 2009 (mistranslated to say “overload” instead of “reset”).

In each case, each Presidential administration convinces itself it can forge a better relationship with Russia through personal diplomacy and upfront concessions. Each of these initiatives initially showed promise before collapsing when confronted with fundamental incompatibilities in geopolitical interests.

Trump's team appears to also believe they can split Russia from China through diplomatic outreach and via immediate concessions in Ukraine. The hope is that doing so can allow the US to reallocate military spending to deterring China in the Pacific while further isolating China on the world stage. Whether this Russian reset will work remains to be seen.

Campaign promises

Lastly, this analysis would not be complete without thinking of Trump’s campaign and his self-image as a master dealmaker. Trump has portrayed US support for Ukraine as a bad deal for America and wants to find a “better deal” for the US. Thus Trump feels pressure to demonstrate the US is getting a clear win out of the Ukraine conflict, though he is also sensitive to being seen as “losing a war”. This creates a complex dynamic where Trump needs a settlement that appears favorable to US interests, yet cannot walk away entirely without political consequences.

Transactional Diplomacy

These three factors have led to an approach that blends pressure tactics with transactional diplomacy. To start, Trump has carried out a public pressure campaign targeting President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In addition to the insults, no new aid packages to Ukraine — military or not — have been announced since Trump took office. Instead, the Trump administration is using the continuation of support as a bargaining chip to pressure Ukraine toward accepting a settlement.

Furthermore, to make a deal more favorable for the US, Trump has been looking to Ukraine’s mineral resources. Originally, Zelenskyy was seeking security guarantees in exchange for giving the US a financial stake in Ukraine's mineral resources, though the final compromise may lack the strong security guarantees Ukraine wanted. Instead, the deal would give American companies preferential access to Ukraine's substantial deposits of lithium, titanium, and other critical minerals essential for defense technology and green energy. Perhaps this would better align Trump’s transactional interests with Ukraine’s defense, which could be good for Ukraine — but the arrangement appears largely exploitative rather than strategic, with terms heavily weighted in America's favor.

Understanding the State of the War

Current Military Balance

By February 2025, Russia controls approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory, having gained roughly 4,200 square kilometers (about 2% more territory) since October. Russia's advances have been slow but steady, averaging 700 square kilometers monthly since November 2024.

Russia has significantly expanded its defense production, manufacturing an estimated 3 million artillery shells each year. This production is supplemented by millions of additional artillery shells from North Korea and improved attack drones from Iran. However, Russia faces important limitations, being able to manufacture only about 200 new armored vehicles annually — far below combat losses. Ukrainian strikes on ammunition depots have also forced some artillery rationing on the Russian side.

On the other side of the battlefield, Ukraine confronts severe constraints after years of intense fighting. The country has suffered critical manpower losses with approximately 46,000 soldiers killed and 390,000 wounded. Artillery ammunition shortages are expected by mid-2025 without US supplies, while air defense systems face the risk of depletion. Despite growing recruitment challenges, Ukraine has seen 10,000+ young Ukrainians sign “special contracts” in early 2025. Domestic arms production has improved significantly but still only meets about 30% of Ukraine's military needs.

European support has increased substantially, with total military aid now nearly matching US contributions (€62 billion vs €64 billion since 2022). The EU has approved a €50 billion Ukraine Facility through 2027 for economic support and is planning to manufacture approximately 2 million artillery shells in 2025 (about 66% of Russian production). However, only 20-25% of arms given to Ukraine so far have been made within the EU, indicating significant production limitations.

Without continued US backing, it is estimated that Ukraine could maintain operations for 6-12 months but with increasing difficulty. To shore up this gap, the Bruegel Institute estimates that Europe would need to spend at least €250 billion extra and raise an army of 300,000 to credibly deter Russia — a tall order that would take years to achieve even with strong political will.

Key Motivations and Strategic Objectives

Ukraine's position remains focused on an existential struggle for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Kursk offensive provides some leverage in negotiations, though the country faces growing domestic war fatigue, with 52% of the population now supporting negotiations even if they involve territorial concessions.

Russia's ultimate goal remains to subjugate Ukraine and prevent its westward integration. Moscow views the conflict as fundamentally zero-sum, where any Ukrainian gain represents a Russian loss and vice-versa. The Kremlin has demonstrated willingness to accept high costs in manpower and equipment for its strategic objectives. Russia's patient strategy involves grinding forward on the battlefield while exploiting Western fatigue, though Russia will feel fatigue as well, with inflation potentially as high as 21% and continued ruble depreciation.

European nations have taken unprecedented steps toward security self-reliance. The UK signed a landmark “One Hundred Year Partnership” with Ukraine. At the same time, the UK expanded defense cooperation with Germany through the Trinity House Agreement — a comprehensive pact that coordinates naval activities in the North Sea, establishes joint defense procurement programs, and creates a shared early warning system for potential Russian aggression.

However, significant political divisions persist across Europe on appropriate support levels for Ukraine, and fragmented decision-making across 27+ nations creates coordination problems that significantly slow response times compared to unified Russian command structures. Domestic political constraints on military spending increases present additional challenges, with strong resistance to the 3% of GDP target that would be necessary for meaningful self-sufficiency. Additionally, Europe faces a critical military imbalance remains in high-tech systems like air defense, precision-guided munitions, and electronic warfare equipment, where Ukraine has historically relied on US capabilities that European partners cannot readily replace in the short term.

Four Scenarios for 2025

The complex interplay between Trump's diplomatic pressure, Ukraine's deteriorating military position, Russia's steady advances, and Europe's evolving response creates multiple possible paths forward.

Based on these military realities and strategic objectives of each actor, four distinct scenarios emerge for Ukraine through the end of 2025:

Scenario 1: Frozen Conflict (35% probability)

Key elements:

• Negotiations continue without resolution of fundamental issues

• US support fluctuates at reduced levels based on political calculations

• European support increases but cannot fully replace American capabilities

• Front lines stabilize in a de-facto stalemate

• No formal peace agreement, but conflict intensity decreases significantly

A frozen conflict represents the default path of least resistance, so it would require an active change of the status quo for this scenario to not happen. If Ukraine rejects a deal perceived as capitulation and is able to get enough European support to continue to defend their frontlines, the front could stabilize. Russia might similarly pause major offensives while consolidating gains. The lack of notable territorial exchange between Ukraine and Russia lately suggests the war is already heading down this path.

If this scenario comes to pass, it would resemble the 2015-2022 Donbas stalemate, but on a much larger scale. The conflict might persist for years, with Ukraine holding defensive lines using European weapons while Russia maintains occupation of seized territories.

Scenario 2: Forced Settlement (45% probability)

Key elements:

• Trump pressures Zelenskyy to accept significant concessions by leveraging aid as survival insurance

• An official ceasefire is signed along current lines of control (with Russia holding ~20% of Ukrainian territory)

• Ukraine accepts neutrality with limitations on military capabilities and a constitutional prohibition on NATO membership for a defined period

• European-led security guarantees substitute for NATO membership

• Economic agreements providing Ukraine reconstruction aid while allowing Russia sanctions relief

• More development of the Ukraine-US minerals deal

A forced settlement is what Trump is trying to pressure the Ukraine into accepting and it’s also clearly what Russia would prefer. And a negotiated settlement would likely include substantial international reconstruction assistance and security guarantees that would be absent in a frozen conflict, which would be appealing to an increasingly fatigued Ukraine. The European Union has indicated it would mobilize a €100+ billion reconstruction package, but only for a recognized peace agreement.

In accepting such a settlement, Ukraine might model themselves after Finland's post-WWII relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite Finland officially losing territory and accepting neutrality in its 1944 peace agreement, Finland maintained its independence and democratic system and eventually joined NATO. From this perspective, a Forced Settlement could represent Ukraine's de facto war of independence from Russia, establishing its long-term sovereignty even at significant short-term cost. That being said, such a positive outcome and future is far from guaranteed.

Scenario 3: European Security Leadership (10% probability)

Key elements:

• US disengagement catalyzes unprecedented European defense coordination

• European military and financial support substantially increases

• European security guarantees attempt to provide credible deterrence

• Russia reassesses cost-benefit calculus of continued aggression

• Negotiations stabilize front lines with verification mechanisms

The best case for Ukraine would be if Europe could dramatically step up their defense investments in Ukraine and fully replace the US's support and actually help Ukraine push back Russia from their areas of control. However, this is a tall order. The European defense industrial base remains fragmented, with critical capability gaps in air defense, electronic warfare, and strategic lift that would take years to address.

Scenario 4: Renewed Escalation with significant Russian gains (10% probability)

Key elements:

• Peace negotiations collapse in acrimony

• Trump cuts Ukraine aid completely after diplomatic failure

• Russia launches a multi-front offensive to capitalize on Western disunity

• Ukraine takes desperate measures to alter conflict dynamics

• European nations face existential decisions about direct intervention

• Ukraine's defensive lines begin to fracture by June 2025

While less likely than controlled outcomes, dramatic escalation in Putin’s favor cannot be ruled out given the enormous stakes and complex military dynamics. If Trump's peace initiative fails dramatically, Trump might withdraw support entirely out of frustration. Putin, sensing opportunity, could authorize a decisive offensive to force Ukrainian capitulation before Europe can organize an effective response. This could result in Putin achieving more of his original war aims, taking significant Ukrainian territory.

Conclusion: Navigating the Path to a Sustainable Ceasefire

The Ukraine conflict in 2025 stands at a crossroads, with ceasefire prospects more tangible yet paradoxically more fraught than at any time since Russia's invasion. Trump's transactional diplomacy, European attempts at independent security initiatives, Ukrainian resilience despite mounting challenges, and Russia's patient war of attrition have created a complex landscape in which multiple outcomes remain possible.

The most likely trajectory through 2025 points toward some form of formalized pause in the fighting – either through a de facto frozen conflict (Scenario 1) or an explicit armistice agreement (Scenario 2). Trump's administration has made ending the war a priority, and both Ukraine and Russia face growing sustainability challenges that make continued high-intensity combat increasingly difficult. However, the structure and durability of any ceasefire will depend critically on the security guarantees that accompany it.

Ukraine remains justifiably weary of international security assurances. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, where Ukraine surrendered the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the US, and UK only ended up granting twenty years of actual security. Without robust mechanisms to prevent future Russian aggression, Ukraine would resist any settlement.

For European policymakers the fundamental question is whether they are willing to make the substantial, sustained investments in defense capabilities and security guarantees necessary to offset diminishing American engagement. The answer will determine not just Ukraine's fate but the future architecture of European security in a new era of great power competition. Without such commitments, any ceasefire risks becoming merely a pause before renewed Russian aggression rather than a sustainable path toward lasting peace.

As 2025 unfolds, the interplay between battlefield dynamics, diplomatic maneuvering, and domestic politics across multiple capitals will determine whether Ukraine achieves a sustainable ceasefire or faces a more precarious future characterized by frozen conflict, forced capitulation, or renewed escalation. The stakes for European security and the international order remain high, with consequences that will continue to matter for decades to come.