The Fordow Paradox: Where do Iran and Israel go from here?

How one stubborn mountain shows nuclear non-proliferation is on life support

About the author: Peter Wildeford is a top forecaster, ranked top 1% every year since 2022. Here, he shares the news and analysis that informs his forecasts.

In the early hours of June 13, 2025, Israeli F-35I Adir stealth fighters crossed into Iranian airspace, launching precision strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Isfahan, while conspicuously avoiding the mountain fortress of Fordow.

Called Operation Rising Lion, this attack involved the Israeli Air Force using over 200 aircraft dropping 330+ munitions on 100 targets. Israeli officials revealed Mossad had established a secret drone base near Tehran months in advance, activating them to destroy missile launchers threatening Israeli cities.

These attacks represent a seismic shift in a decades-long standoff over Iran's nuclear ambitions. What makes Israel's response extraordinary isn't just the scale of destruction to nuclear infrastructure, but the simultaneous decapitation of Iran's military and scientific leadership. The Israeli attacks killed at least 78 people, but most notably led to the deaths of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Salami — who controlled Iran's ballistic missiles and regional proxy networks — and top two nuclear architects Fereydoon Abbasi and Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi who were key figures in Iran's weapons program. Yet for all this devastation, the strikes reveal a critical limitation: Israel couldn't touch Fordow, where Iran performs its most dangerous enrichment.

This creates the Fordow Paradox that will define the coming crisis: The US possesses the military capability to destroy Fordow but lacks the political will, while Israel has the will but not the capability. This fundamental misalignment between America's power and Israel's urgency explains why we're watching not just another round of strikes, but potentially the first act in nuclear proliferation's next wave.

Understanding Iran's Strategic Trap

Iran finds itself in the weakest strategic position in decades.

Firstly, the basic military math is brutal — Iran just doesn’t have the military might to match Israel, with Israel having a much larger and more modern military. On top of that, if Iran gets too out of line, US B-2 bombers from nearby Diego Garcia can easily join Israeli forces.

More critically, Iran is fundamentally vulnerable. Israel’s Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow systems can intercept Iranian attacks. But Iran's air defenses lie in ruins after Israel destroyed most of them in October 2024, allowing Israel to strike most of Iran without interception. And Iran can't replace their systems and weapons quickly. Russia, Iran’s supplier, is burning through its own air defense inventory in Ukraine and can't spare replacements.

And this vulnerability is to more than Iran’s military. Iran’s Khuzestan oil facilities, Bushehr nuclear plant, and Persian Gulf ports all sit exposed. Any Israeli strike on Kharg Island or Khuzestan refineries — collectively handling 90% of Iran's oil exports — would crater their already sanctions-damaged economy. Oil prices would spike globally, but Iran would be unable to capitalize.

Iran has historically tried to make up for this by operating powerful proxy terrorist organizations that could strike back, but the proxy network that once projected Iranian power is now decimated — Israel has now gutted Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah is down 50-80% capability, and the collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria eliminates the previous weapons corridor from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Jointly, these factors have led the regional power dynamic to shift fundamentally. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states see a weakened Iran no longer able to threaten their oil infrastructure. Israel demonstrated it can strike most of Iran at will while Iran's October 1 attack — their largest ever — achieved virtually nothing. Israel knows this, and is pressing the advantage.

What does Iran want?

Why is Iran willing to endure huge economic sanctions and Israeli attacks in order to maintain and grow its nuclear program?

From Iran's perspective, the nuclear program isn't about annihilation fantasies. Iran's strategic calculus is brutally simple: they're surrounded by nuclear-armed states (Israel, Pakistan, Russia) and US military bases. And they’ve seen what happened to non-nuclear regimes that cross the US — Libya's Gaddafi gave up his WMD program and ended up dead in a ditch, Ukraine gave up Soviet nukes and got invaded, and Hussein's Iraq had no WMDs and got invaded anyway. Meanwhile, North Korea built nukes, kept them, and gets to enjoy summits and diplomatic envoys. The lesson isn't subtle¹.

This calculation becomes more complex given Iran's internal dynamics. The regime faces persistent protests and deep unpopularity, with regular demonstrations over economic conditions, women's rights, and political freedom. A nuclear program that triggers more sanctions could further destabilize domestic support, while a successful weapon might paradoxically embolden opposition movements who see the regime as more secure from external threats.

This explains why Iran is developing missiles that could carry warheads 3,000km — not because they have suicidal dreams of nuking Rome, but because credible second-strike capability against American bases and European capitals fundamentally alters the intervention calculus. Would the US invade Iran if Iran could vaporize Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar or hit NATO headquarters in Brussels? Probably not.

The Iranian regime sees nuclear capability as solving three existential threats simultaneously: Israeli airstrikes become too risky when miscalculation means losing Tel Aviv to a nuke, American regime-change fantasies evaporate when the Sixth Fleet is in range, and internal dissent loses steam when opposition leaders know toppling the government might mean losing the country's nuclear umbrella against Israel and the US.

The problem at Fordow

In the rubble of Operation Rising Lion, one facility stands untouched: Fordow. This underground enrichment facility, buried 80-90 meters beneath granite inside Mount Qaleh, is where Iran enriches uranium to near-weapons grade. Israeli F-35s can't touch it - only nuclear weapons or US MOPs could penetrate that deep.

Yesterday, in direct response to the IAEA censure, Iran announced it would completely replace Fordow's IR-1 centrifuges with sixth-generation IR-6 machines. These more efficient centrifuges could get Iran to a nuclear bomb even faster than now, sprinting to weapons-grade enrichment in days. Satellites can't see inside the mountain. IAEA inspectors visit periodically, not daily. Iran could potentially sprint to weapons-grade between inspections.

If Iran reaches 90%, they'd need just 2-6 months to build a crude device. Israel has promised preventive strikes but can't hit Fordow conventionally. This creates the most dangerous window - where Iran has weapons material but hasn't built a bomb yet, and Israel might consider extreme options.

The US-Israel Divide and the Fordow Paradox

The critical variable is Trump's position. His administration is offering a deal that allows some enrichment despite public red lines about “zero enrichment.” This gives Iran hope they can thread the needle — keep enough capability to eventually weaponize while getting sanctions relief. But this is exactly what Israel didn’t like and why they wanted to strike.

The Obama administration's 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) embodied America's preferred approach: accepting Iranian enrichment under strict monitoring in exchange for sanctions relief. Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018, but his second administration appears ready to return to the same basic framework.

This is the Fordow Paradox — the US can destroy Fordow while Israel cannot; Israel wants Fordow destroyed while the US does not. The US is willing to accept Iran as a threshold nuclear state to avoid another Middle Eastern entanglement and focus on China. Plus the optionality of the US destroying Fordow is good deterrence for preventing Iran from doing too much to attack US interests.

Additionally, war with Iran means pain the US won't accept. Iran can potentially close the Strait of Hormuz where 21% of global oil passes, activating remaining proxies, and forcing a multi-carrier response with Iraq War-level casualties — all while depleting munitions needed for Pacific contingencies. To handle this and reopen the Strait, the US may need to be prepared to accept casualties not seen since the Iraq War. Worse every bomber sortie against Iranian targets is one not available for Pacific contingencies and every interceptor fired at Iranian missiles is one not stockpiled for Taiwan. This is why the US prefers even a nuclear-threshold Iran to the alternative: not from weakness, but from a cold calculation that Iran can be deterred while China cannot.

But Israel can accept a war and cannot accept a nuclear Iran. Israel's entire population lies within range of Iranian missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads with minimal warning. Israel’s calculus is different. This paradox explains exactly why Israel violated the US’s wishes and struck precisely when negotiations were imminent. Israeli planners understood that any US-Iran deal would likely legitimize enrichment at Fordow — the one facility they cannot touch. The Israeli strikes may have destroyed infrastructure, but their real target was the negotiating table set for Sunday. If Israel can't destroy Fordow, at least they could try to destroy the process that would legitimize it.

The critical snapback forcing function

There's another countdown running parallel to Iran's enrichment — and it might be even more dangerous. When Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, the US returned to unilateral sanctions. But the UK, Germany, and France stayed in, preserving a crucial diplomatic weapon: the snapback mechanism, which allows automatic reimposition of UN sanctions if Iran is found to have violated the JCPOA.

Why do UN sanctions matter when the US already has “maximum pressure” and the UK, Germany, and France could impose their own sanctions any time they wanted to? Because UN-level sanctions are significantly more harsh — they ban all 193 UN member states from trading with Iran and trigger automatic secondary sanctions on any entity worldwide that defies these sanctions. Current lifelines to the Iranian economy, like China and India, would have to choose between Iranian oil and the global financial system. They’d likely choose the latter.

But here's the trap: this snapback mechanism expires October 18, 2025, and it's already mid-June. With UN procedural requirements and Russia poised to take an obstructionist Security Council presidency starting in September, Europe has maybe 6-8 weeks to decide to trigger these if they’re going to happen before Russia can block them. Iran has explicitly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if snapback occurs.

The potential for snapback creates a pressure cooker with no good release valve. Pull snapback now and Iran will sprint for nukes before sanctions can bite. Don't pull snapback now and the tool is lost, likely leading to a permanent nuclear-threshold Iran. Every week of European paralysis, Iran enriches more uranium and Israel grows more desperate.

This is likely a contributing factor to why Israel struck when they did — not just to damage infrastructure, but to force Europe's hand while there's still time. The message is stark: use snapback now or watch us handle Iran ourselves, consequences be damned. The October deadline transforms every negotiation into nuclear chicken, with the Fordow Paradox meeting the Snapback Dilemma in a collision that could go nuclear.

Five Scenarios for the Rest of 2025

So this is truly chaotic, with pressure coming from a lot of different directions and a lot of moves and counter-moves are available. Israel likely can’t destroy Fordow, but maybe Mossad could pull off something truly unexpected like they did with Hezbollah pagers or Stuxnet. And even if Israel can’t hit Fordow, Israel could just attack Iran conventionally. The US could do the same. Meanwhile, Europe and the UN could force devastating sanctions and destroy Iran economically. And of course, Iran could still race for the bomb or levy a lot of conventional pain, including closing the Strait of Hormuz. All while Saudi Arabia could get nukes too.

All of these variables make prediction difficult. But based on the strategic calculations of each actor and the physical constraints of the Fordow facility, five distinct scenarios emerge for the Iran nuclear crisis through year-end.

Scenario 1: Deal by EOY2025 (25% probability)

Key elements:

• Trump pushes through a deal allowing limited enrichment at Fordow under monitoring

• Iran accepts caps at 20% enrichment with enhanced IAEA inspections, destroying their 60% enriched stockpile

• Israel grudgingly accepts US security guarantees and enhanced defense cooperation

• Europe holds back on snapback in exchange for Iranian concessions

• Sanctions relief from the US is phased in over 2-3 years tied to compliance milestones

This represents Trump's preferred outcome — threading the needle between Israeli redlines and Iranian demands while claiming a foreign policy win. The deal would likely cap Iranian enrichment at 20% (still below weapons-grade) with real-time IAEA monitoring at all facilities including Fordow. In exchange, Iran gets phased sanctions relief worth potentially $150 billion over three years.

Why might this happen? Trump needs a win after the embarrassment of Israel defying him with Operation Rising Lion. Iran's economy desperately needs relief with inflation potentially hitting 21% and the Iranian currency currently in freefall. Even Netanyahu might swallow this bitter pill if it comes with massive US defense guarantees — perhaps including giving Israel long-sought MOPs that could actually threaten to destroy Fordow. Europe would celebrate avoiding both snapback drama and regional war. This would be hardly stable, but that might be the best anyone can hope for given the alternatives.

Scenario 2: Iran gets nuke by EOY2025 (10% probability)

Key elements:

• European snapback triggers Iranian NPT withdrawal

• Iran sprints to 90% enrichment using new IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow

• First Iranian nuclear device assembled within 60 days

• Israel launches desperate strikes including possible tactical nuclear use

• US forced to choose between accepting nuclear Iran or direct military intervention

• Regional nuclear cascade with Saudi program accelerating

The nightmare scenario begins with Europe triggering snapback before the October deadline, perhaps after another IAEA report showing Iranian non-compliance. Iran, viewing this as economic warfare, withdraws from the NPT and orders an all-out sprint at Fordow, aiming to ensure regime survival by becoming the next North Korea.

This scenario becomes even more likely if Netanyahu's government collapses and hardliners take control, or if Khamenei dies and IRGC factions use nuclear acceleration as a power play. Israel would face an existential choice: accept a nuclear Iran, launch conventional strikes that can't stop Fordow, or cross the nuclear threshold themselves with tactical weapons against Iranian facilities. The US would face immense pressure to act but might calculate that a nuclear Iran can be deterred like Pakistan or North Korea. Saudi Arabia would immediately activate its Pakistani nuclear arrangement, starting a cascade where Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE all sprint for bombs within five years.

Scenario 3: Large-scale war by EOY2025 (35% probability)

Key elements:

• Israeli strikes expand to infrastructure targets across Iran

• Iran activates Hezbollah's 50,000+ rockets and attempts Hormuz closure

• US drawn in to protect Gulf shipping and US military bases

• European forces deploy to secure energy supplies

• Conflict potentially spreads to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon

• Potential global recession triggered by $150+ oil prices

War erupts after either failed negotiations or Iranian nuclear acceleration. Israel, deciding they cannot accept any Iranian enrichment, launch massive strikes against Iranian oil refineries, ports, military bases, and whatever nuclear infrastructure they can reach. The attacks would make Rising Lion look like a training exercise, escalating to 500+ aircraft and lasting weeks rather than hours.

Iran retaliates by activating every proxy simultaneously. Hezbollah's degraded but still substantial rocket arsenal rains down on Israeli cities while Iraqi militias assault US bases. Most critically, Iran attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz using mines, speedboats, and coastal missiles. With 21% of global oil transiting the strait, prices spike above $150/barrel overnight and potentially go even higher. The US deploys multiple carrier groups to force the Strait open, accepting casualties not seen since Iraq. Europe, facing energy catastrophe, joins the effort. The conflict metastasizes across the region with no clear end state — Iran can't win conventionally but can impose massive costs, while the US+Israel+Europe coalition can't achieve regime change without a larger-than-Iraq-style invasion nobody wants.

Scenario 4: Managed Escalation - The New Normal (23% probability)

Key elements:

• No deal reached but no war either

• Israel conducts strikes every 3-4 months to “mow the grass”

• Iran enriches steadily but strategically stays below 90%

• Iran orders calibrated proxy attacks that avoid triggering full war

• US and Europe provide just enough support to prevent collapse

• Economic warfare continues with sanctions and sabotage

The most cynical outcome might also be the most stable: accepting permanent crisis as the new equilibrium. Israel strikes Iranian facilities every few months — enough to slow the program but not enough to trigger all-out war. Iran enriches uranium steadily, reaching 70-80% purity but stopping just short of weapons-grade to avoid crossing the ultimate red line.

This scenario emerges if all parties conclude the alternatives are worse than living with permanent tension. Israel can't stomach a deal but can't risk full war. Iran won't abandon its nuclear hedge but won't sprint to weapons. The US, focused on China, provides just enough support to prevent Israeli collapse or Iranian breakout. It's nobody's first choice but might be everyone's least-bad option. Think of it as the Iran-Israel version of the India-Pakistan dynamic — permanent nuclear tension with occasional flare-ups but mutual understanding that full escalation means mutual destruction.

Scenario 5: Iran voluntarily gives up its nuclear ambitions by EOY2025 (7% probability)

Key elements:

• Iran voluntarily gives up its nuclear ambitions, likely through regime change within Iran due to Khamenei dying or getting overthrown but possibly due to bowing to overwhelming pressure

• No deal is necessary as Iran is no longer pursuing nuclear weapons, even at threshold status.

• Iran potentially re-enters the international order

• Iran potentially trades complete nuclear dismantlement for massive sanctions relief and security guarantees

This scenario requires a black swan event — most likely Khamenei's death sparking succession chaos or an internal struggle leading to Khamenei being ousted or forced to change his mind. Why might pragmatists win? The nuclear program has delivered only poverty and isolation. Iran's GDP per capita has collapsed 40% since 2011, inflation ravages savings, and the educated middle class flees abroad. Operation Rising Lion demonstrated Iran's naked vulnerability — their air defenses are rubble, their scientists dead, their allies decimated. A pragmatist faction might calculate that without air defenses, proxies, or allies, the nuclear program just paints a target on their backs.

This scenario becomes more plausible if Europe triggers snapback and China/India signal they'll comply with UN sanctions. Facing complete economic collapse, even hardliners might accept that North Korea-style isolation means revolution within 2-3 years. Better to trade away a nuclear program they can't protect for regime survival and economic revival.

The low probability reflects massive obstacles: IRGC hardliners would resist violently, Israel would suspect any deal as deception, and Iranian nationalists across the spectrum view the nuclear program as sovereignty itself. But Libya gave up WMDs for reintegration (before Gaddafi's fate), South Africa dismantled its bombs, and Ukraine traded nukes for guarantees. Under extreme pressure with the right leadership, Iran could follow suit — transforming from regional pariah to trading partner overnight.

Nuclear non-proliferation on life support?

By December 2025, we'll know whether the Middle East faces nuclear-armed Iran, regional war, or permanent crisis management. But the larger pattern is already emerging: we're watching non-proliferation face its steepest stress test since North Korea's 1994 withdrawal from the NPT.

Operation Rising Lion may mark a historical inflection point — not in preventing a nuclear Iran, but in revealing strong limits of military prevention. Israel executed a textbook counter-proliferation operation — dead scientists, destroyed facilities, total air dominance, Mossad infiltration so deep they reportedly pre-positioned drones near Tehran. Yet it achieved only partial success because Fordow sits under 90 meters of granite, enriching uranium beyond conventional reach. The post-1945 order assumed nuclear programs required massive industrial complexes vulnerable to B-52s. It breaks down when critical infrastructure fits inside a mountain.

Trump offering deals that accept enrichment, Europe paralyzed over whether to do snapback, Saudi Arabia potentially exploring nuclear options — these aren't necessarily failures but attempts to navigate an evolving reality. Saudi Arabia has already vowed to pursue nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, potentially through Pakistan — a cascade that could see Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE all sprint for bombs within years.

Whether Fordow represents the death of non-proliferation or forces its evolution into something unrecognizable remains to be seen. But under 90 meters of granite, the Iranian centrifuges keep spinning.

1. There is one success story here though: South Africa.